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Abstract
This paper examines potential impacts of banks leverage on their incentives to
manage their liquidity. We analyse a model where banks control their liquidity risk by
managing their liquid asset positions. In the basic framework, a model with a single
bank, where the possibility of selling long-term assets when in need of liquidity is not
taken into account, we nd that the bank chooses to prudently manage its liquidity
risk only when its leverage is low. In a model with multiple banks and a secondary
market for long-term assets, we nd that a banking system where banks are highly
leveraged can be prone to liquidity crises. Our model predicts a typical pattern of
liquidity crises that is consistent with what was observed during the 2007-2009 crisis.
Key words: Leverage, Liquidity Risk, Moral Harzard, Cash-In-The-Market Pric-
ing
JEL Codes: G21, D82
1 Introduction
Liquidity played an enormous role in the global nancial crisis of 2007-2009. During the
period, many banks experienced di¢ culties because they did not manage their liquidity in
a prudent manner. In response to the aws in banksliquidity risk management revealed
by the crisis, the Basel III committee has proposed two regulatory liquidity standards
to complement its revised capital requirement framework in promoting the stability of
the banking sector. Whereas the objective of the capital requirement is to improve the
solvency of the banks, the two liquidity requirements aim to promote a better liquidity
risk management. One question then arises, as pointed out by Tirole (2011): whether one
should append a liquidity measure to the solvency one". Put di¤erently, can one trust the
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nancial institutions to properly manage their liquidity, once their leverage is controlled
by capital requirement?
In the literature, two main theories predominate as to the role of capital regulation.
The rst one posits that a banks capital forms a kind of cushion against losses. The
second one puts forward the idea that the capital regulation can be seen as an incentive
device to curb the excessive risk-taking behavior of banks. Hence, so far, the banking
literature focuses on the e¤ects of the banksleverage on the bankschoice of credit risk.
In this paper, we develop a model to examine potential impacts of banksleverage on their
management of liquidity risk.
We analyse a framework where banks control their liquidity risk by managing their
liquid asset positions. The context we have in mind is one of banks that are nanced by
debt and equity. Due to investorsdemand of liquid investment, banks can issue only short-
term debt and thus expose themselves to a liquidity risk that stems from the maturity
mismatch between asset payo¤s and desired redemptions. To be insured against this risk,
banks need to carry some liquid assets on their balance sheet. We study the banks optimal
liquidity holdings and how they are a¤ected by the banks leverage.
We assume specically that banks have choice between two types of assets. The rst
one is a kind of liquid reserves that have a net return of zero. The second asset is a
constant return to scale investment project (long-term asset) that produces a random
cash ow only after two periods. Although the latter is more protable than the former,
its capacity to generate liquidity in some future states of nature may be restricted. Inspired
of the recent crisis, we model the liquidity shock by the arrival, at an intermediate date,
of some new information about the quality of the project. When good news are revealed,
the liquidity raised by pledging the projects cash ows is su¢ cient to cover the banks
renance demand. However, if bad news are disclosed, the project has limited pledgeability,
which may lead to the banksclosure if they do not hold liquid reserves ex-ante.
In practice when in need of liquidity, banks typically have three options: either they use
their ex-ante liquidity holdings or they borrow against the future cash ows generated by
their long-term assets or they sell these assets in the secondary market. We rst consider,
in the basic model, the case of an individual bank that could raise liquidity using just
the two rst options. Our focus is then on the banks precautionary motive for liquidity
holdings, i.e. holding liquidity to be insured against liquidity risk. Our main nding is that
the bank hold adequate liquidity to protect itself against this risk if and only if its leverage
ratio is low. The intuition lies in the fact that when leverage is high, the banks exposure to
liquidity risk is large. Buying insurance is then too costly, which induces the bank to forgo
the insurance option and gamble. In our simple setup, there exists a threshold of leverage
below which the bank will choose to manage its liquidity risk prudently, which implies
that a properly designed capital requirement is su¢ cient to induce a better liquidity risk
management. We are not claiming that this is a general result. All we are claiming is that
a restriction on banks leverage can have positive impact on their incentives to manage
their liquidity. Hence, liquidity requirement and capital requirement need to be jointly
designed in an optimal way to avoid overregulation.
Next, we extend our basic setting into a multi-banks contexts that allow to take into
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consideration the possibility of asset sales. Precisely, we analyze a three-bank setting in
which banks that are in need of liquidity can sell their long-term asset in the secondary
market. We assume that because of asset specicity, the only potential purchasers of one
banks asset are other banks. Hence, the market price depends on the overall amount of
liquidity available in the system for asset purchases.
Allowing for asset sales has two interesting implications. First, given that the mar-
ket price of long-term asset depends on the aggregate liquidity of the banking system,
the distribution of leverage in the system should be matter for banks liquidity prole.
Moreover, it is also interesting to see how the impact of banks leverage on the banks
choice of liquidity holdings has consequences on deleveraging and re sales in the banking
sector during liquidity crises. The second implication lies in the fact that there exists an
additional reason for banks to hold liquidity beside the precautionary motive. The idea is
that banks that survive the liquidity shock have opportunity to buy assets put for sale by
banks that have liquidity demand. If such assets are sold at price below their fundamental
value, banks that do have enough liquidity stand to make windfall prots from purchasing
assets.
By characterizing the rational expectation equilibria, we derive a set of results that
shed light on these issues. We nd that funding liquidity and market liquidity of long-term
asset are positively related. We also nd that a banking system that consists of highly
leveraged banks can be prone to liquidity crises. Our model predicts a typical pattern of
the crises: High leverage results in low ex-ante liquidity holdings of banks. Then, when
a liquidity shock is realized, many banks have trouble in honoring their debt obligations
and thus have to sell their investment at re-sale prices, which causes the failure of banks
that are in need of liquidity. This pattern is consistent with what was observed during the
2007-2009 crisis.
The organization of the paper is as follows. After discussing the related literature in
the next section, we describe, in Section 3, the basic model. In Section 4 we analyse the
banksoptimal liquidity holdings and the e¤ect of banks leverage on this choice. Section
5 consider multiple bank setting and the consequences of permitting asset sales. Finally
we conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the rst one that addresses the
impact of banksleverage on the banksincentives to manage their liquidity risk. Still the
insights on which our model builds are related to various literatures.
The idea that the liability structure of a bank may have e¤ect on its asset composition
is linked to the large literature that evaluates the foundation for the imposition of capital
regulation. See, among others, Rochet (1992), Besanko and Kanatas (1996), Blum (1999),
Repullo (2004)1. This literature studies how the incentives of banks to take excessive risk
can be curbed by requiring banks to maintain an adequate capital ratio. While the focus
of this literature is the impact on the banksincentives to take credit risk, our paper aims
1For an excellent review of this literature, see Freixas and Rochet (2008), VanHoose (2007).
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to examine the e¤ect on their incentives to manage their liquidity risk.
In our paper, the reason for banks to hold liquidity is based on two assumptions: (i)
ex-ante uncertainty about the liquidity needs; (ii) limited pledgeability due to asymmetric
information. Those two assumptions are similar to those used by Hölmstrom and Tirole
(1998) to analyse the liquidity demand of corporate sector and the role of government in
supplying liquidity. The main di¤erence lies in the fact that in Hölmstrom and Tirole
(1998), liquidity shocks arise as production shocks to the rmstechnologies. The size of
the shocks is exogenous and especially independent of the rmsbalance sheet characteris-
tic. We rather derive liquidity needs as being determined in equilibrium by asset-liability
mismatch. Such di¤erence explains why in Hölmstrom and Tirole (1998), the rmsliq-
uidity demand does not depend on their liability structure whereas in our framework it
does. We believe that liquidity shocks arising from technology shocks as in Hölmstrom
and Tirole (1998) are suitable for non-nancial enterprise while our formulation is more
reasonable in the context of nancial institutions.
The present paper is also related to several contributions that use the "cash-in-the-
market-pricing" mechanism proposed by Allen and Gale (1994, 2004, 2005) to understand
the nancial fragility. Bolton et al. (2011) construct a framework to analyse the optimal
composition of inside liquidity (i.e. the cash reserves held by nancial intermediaries
themselves to meet their liquidity demand) and outside liquidity (i.e. the liquidity holdings
of other investors with a longer horizon). They examine the asset allocation between cash
and long-term investment of two types of agents, short and long-run investors. Short-run
investors (SRs) can be hit by a liquidity shock that takes the form of a late maturity of
their investment. The key novelty of their analysis is the focus on the timing of liquidity
trades. They assume that SRs had the choice of either immediately responding to the
liquidity shock by selling their assets at re-sale prices, or taking a chance that the shock
might be short-lived at the risk of having to raise liquidity at a later date under much
worse condition. They then analyse how the expectation about the timing of liquidity
trades a¤ects the investment decision of SRs. Our paper instead points to the e¤ect of
the banksleverage on their choice of investment.
A more closely related to our work is the paper of Acharya and Viswanathan (2011b)
that builds a model to understand the de-leveraging of the nancial sector during crises.
They examine how adverse shocks that materialize in good economic times, represented by
high expectations about economic fundamentals, lead to greater de-leveraging and asset
price deterioration. In their framework, banks issue short-term debts to nance their
investment in long-term risky assets. In response to a liquidity shock, banks raise new
debt and, if necessary, sell their assets. Good expectations about the quality of those assets
enable low-capital banks to be funded ex-ante and the resulting distribution of leverage in
the economy can potentially lead to more serious re-sale problems when adverse shocks
arise in good times. Our multiple banks setup with asset trading is in fact inspired of
Acharya and Viswanathan (2011b)s setting. The main di¤erence is that we allow banks
to hold liquidity to self-insure against liquidity shock, which enables us to shed light on
how banksincentives to manage liquidity risk are a¤ected by their liability structure.
Several papers study the bankschoice of investment between liquid and illiquid assets.
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They di¤er in the determinants they focus on. Acharya et al. (2011a) examine the e¤ect
of policy interventions to resolve bank failure on ex-ante bank liquidity. Malherbe (2014)
provides a model in which the fear of future market illiquidty due to adverse selection may
trigger hoarding behavior today. Heider et al. (2015) analyse banks liquidity holdings
to shed light on how banksprivate information about the risk of their assets a¤ects the
trading and pricing of liquidity in the interbank market. Acharya et al. (2015) studies how
the liquidity choices of rms are shaped by the risk-sharing opportunities in the economy.
Our paper considers the e¤ect of banksliability structure on their liquidity choices.
Finally, some papers address the optimal design of bank liquidity requirements. Calomiris
et al. (2014) develop a theory of liquidity requirements which focuses on the role of cash
in incentivizing banks to properly manage their default risk. They argue that because
cash is riskless asset and cash holdings are observable, banks can commit to exert e¤ort
on risk management by holding a su¢ cient amount of cash. Hence, in Calomiris et al.
(2014), a liquidity requirement that takes the form of a narrow cash reserve requirement
can be used to provide banks incentives to reduce credit risk. The present paper considers
the traditional role of cash holdings in limiting the liquidity risk and examine whether the
banksincentives to manage this risk are a¤ected by their capitalisation.
Walther (2015) constructs a model to analyse how nancial regulation in the form of
restriction on maturity mismatch can be used to avoid socially wasteful re sales. It is
found that there exists situations where re sales arise in the decentralized competitive
equilibrium. In that case, imposing a linear constraint on banks is su¢ cient to restore
e¢ ciency. Such constraint can be implemented by regulatory tools such as Net Stable
Funding Ratio or Liquidity Coverage Ratio. In Walther (2005), banks are ex-ante identical
and banksshort-term debt takes the form of collateralized debt with exogenous hair-cut.
In contrast, in our model banks are ex-ante heterogenous and the interest rate on the short-
term debt is derived in equilibrium depending on the bankschoices of asset composition.
Walther (2005) does not examine how the banks decisions on maturity mismatch are
inuenced by their capital ratio as we do in the present paper.
3 The basic model
In this section, we describe the problem of an individual bank that seeks to manage
its liquidity risk. We consider an economy that lasts for three dates t = 0; 1; 2: There is a
bank with balance sheet of size normalized to 1. We assume that the bank is funded at
date 0 by equity (of amount E) and short-term debt (of amount 1   E). The face value
of short-term debt repaid at date 1 is denoted by D.
The bank has access to two investment opportunities. The rst one is a storage technol-
ogy, referred to as cash, that has a net return of zero. The second investment opportunity
is a constant return to scale project, referred to as long-term asset, that requires a start-up
investment at date t = 0 and generates an uncertain cash ow at date t = 2. Figure 1
summarizes the payo¤ structure of the project. Precisely, if the bank invests 1 at date 0 in
this project, it receives ~y > 0 at date 2 with probability , and zero with the complement
probability. ~y is not known at date 0 but will be revealed at date 1. At date 0, we only
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Figure 1: The risky investment opportunity
know that there are two possible states at date 1: high or low state. In the high state,
which happens with probability , ~y is equal to yH whereas in the low state, ~y takes
a lower value yL. We assume that the realization of ~y is observable but not veriable.
Therefore, the short-term debt repayment cannot be contingent on such information.
Assumption 1 The investment project has positive NPV:
E (~y) = yH + (1  ) yL > 1
Observe that on average, investing in the project is more protable than holding cash.
However, given the mistmach of the timing between the banks liquidity needs and the
projects cash ow, the bank may optimally choose to invest a positive amount in the
storage technology.
At date 1, the bank has two sources of liquidity to repay its short-term debt. The rst
one is the amount of cash it holds from date 0. The second one is the new borrowing it
can make by pledging the date 2 - cash ow generated by the project. The extent to which
the bank can pledge its future cash ow may be constrained by a moral hazard problem.
Specically, we assume that between date 1 and date 2, after raising new funds and before
the projects cash ow is realized, the bank can switch investment to another asset with
probability of success 1 and success cash ow y1.
Assumption 2 The moral hazard problem matters only in the low state:
1 < ; yH > y1 > yL and
1
2
yL > 1y1
Hence, the new asset has a lower success probability but its success return is higher
than that of the project in the low state. Assuming that 1y1 < 12yL ensures that
investing in the 1-asset is a negative net present value investment for the bank. The main
implication of Assumption 2 is that while in the high state the bank can pledge the full
value of its long-term asset to outside investors, the banks borrowing capacity in the low
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state is strictly lower than the expected present value of its future cashows. We could
alternatively interpret the asset switch as the fact that the bank refrains from monitoring.
Precisely, if a high value of ~y is realized at date 1, the quality of the investment project
happens to be very good and no intermediate monitoring needs to be done. However, when
a low value is realized, the projects return depends on the banks monitoring activities. If
the bank refrains from them, it can save on the monitoring cost and thus, receive more in
case of success. Nevertheless, the success probability will be reduced. The realization of
the low state can be seen as the materialization of a liquidity shock that put constraints
on the amount of liquidity the bank can raise and makes the rollover of its short-term debt
problematic.
If the bank cannot raise enough liquidity, it will be closed and the banks investment
project is liquidated. We assume that the liquidation value is equal to `, which is inde-
pendent of the state. ` can be interpreted as the minimum possible value of the asset (for
nancial assets) or as the resale price (for physical assets)
Assumption 3 The value of the invesment project to the banks nanciers is less than
the value to the bank:
` < yL
Assumption 3 is justied in situations where the management of the banks assets
requires sophisticated expertise that the banks nanciers do not have.
Assumption 4
yH + (1  ) ` > 1
Assumption 4 means that the expected payo¤ of the project, even if it is liquidated
early, is positive2. This assumption implies that at date 0, it is still worth for the bank to
invest in the project even if the bank may be closed if the liquidity shock is realized.
The timing of the model, which is summarized in Figure 2, is as follows:
 At date 0, the bank chooses the composition of its assets. Denote by c the amount
of cash it holds. Thus, 1  c will be invested in the project.
 At date 1; rst, the value of ~y is observed. Then, the bank tries to raise funds to pay
back its short-term debt. If the bank cannot raise su¢ cient liquidity, it is liquidated.
 At date 32 , between date 1 and date 2, the bank may switch its investment to the
1-asset.
 At date 2, the projects cash ow is realized and payments are settled.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the banks optimal cash holdings, some addi-
tional remarks are in order. First, we take as given the banks maturity mismatch: banks
creditors want short-term debts, while borrowers need long-term credit. We assume that
the bank cannot issue long-term debt.
2Note that Assumption 1 is automatically satised if both Assumptions 3 and 4 are true.
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Figure 2: The timeline
Second, does our banks short-term debt correspond to wholesale or retail debt? One
of the main di¤erences between the two types is the fact that retail deposits are insured
but wholesale deposits are not. This di¤erence implies that the repayment promised to
retail depositors does not depend on the banks choice of assets while the repayment to
wholesale creditors does. In this model, motivated by the nancial crisis 2007 - 2009, we
refer to the wholesale debts such as the ones held by Money Market Funds. The debt
repayment is thus endogenously determined in our framework by the break-even condition
of the banks debtholders.
Concerning our formulation of the liquidity shock, note that in the present framework,
this shock does not come from the uncertainty about the amount of short-term debt that
need to be repaid, as commonly assumed in the model with retail deposits. Indeed, in our
setup, the bank knows exactly as of date 0 how much debt it has to repay. What it does
not know is its funding capacity at the time the repayment is made. If everything goes
well, i.e. there are good news about the quality of the banks asset, the banks borrowing
capacity is not constrained and thus, the need to renance the short-term debt does not
create any problem to the bank. However, when bad news about the banks investment
are revealed, its capacity to raise funds is restricted. As a consequence, the bank may fail
to roll-over its debt. The above-described scenario is analogous to what happened in the
2007-2009 crisis. Prior to the crisis, banks nanced a growing portion of their subprime
mortgage loans with short-term debts such as repos or asset-backed commercial papers
(ABCP). Everything worked very well until an increase in subprime mortgage defaults
was rst noted in February 2007, which was followed by a deterioration of the banks
short-term funding market. Many banks then experienced di¢ culties in rolling-over their
short-term debts.
4 Analysis
We now analyse the banks optimal investment decision. Our main objective is to
study how much cash the bank will hold on its balance sheet and how this decision is
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a¤ected by the banks leverage. We will proceed in two steps. First, we determine the
banks borrowing capacity at date 1. Then, we examine its optimal cash holdings at date
0.
4.1 Borrowing Capacity
At date 1, the bank has to repay its short-term debt D. It has c units of cash, which
implies that its liquidity needs are D  c. The bank can raise this amount by issuing new
debt repaid at date 2. We now determine how much the bank can borrow at date 1 by
pledging the future cash ow generated by its long-term asset.
If the high state is realized at date 1, the moral hazard problem does not matter, the
bank can pledge the full value of its asset to investors, i.e. they can borrow up to yH ,
and there is no problem in rolling over its short-term debt.
If the low state is realized, the incentive compatibility condition which ensures that
the bank does not switch to the riskier asset is as follows:
 (yL   f)  1 (y1   f)
where f is the face value of the new debt issued against one unit of long-term asset. After
simplication, this yields:
f  yL   1y1
   1 = f

f represents the maximum cash ow that can be pledged to outside investors (i.e. f
is the maximum pledgeable income). The banks maximum borrowing capacity (per unit
of long-term asset) in the low state is thus f. Notice that f < yL. We make an
additional assumption as follows:
Assumption 5
` < f
Assumption 5 ensures that new borrowing is a better way to raise liquidity for the
bank than partial liquidation of its long-term asset. The following lemma summarizes the
banks situation at date 1:
Lemma 1 At date 1:
(i) If D c1 c  f, the bank can always roll over its debt.
(ii) If D c1 c > f
, the bank is liquidated when hit by a liquidity shock (i.e. when the low
state is realized).
We refer to the rst situation as the one where the bank is liquid. The second situation
is referred to as the case where the bank is illiquid.
4.2 Optimal Cash Holding Policy
In the next step, we study the banks decision regarding the amount of cash held.
Given two possible situations of the bank at date 1, we will rst determine how much cash
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the bank holds in each situation. Then, we characterize the optimal cash policy of the
bank.
If the bank chooses c so that it will be liquid at date 1, the amount of cash held by
the bank is determined by the following program3:
li = Max
0c1
f [(1  c) yH   fH ] + (1  )  [(1  c) yL   fL]g
where fs, s = H;L is the face value of the new debt issued at date 1 in the state s:
fs =
D   c

for all s
subject to the break-even condition of short-term investors:
D + (1  )D = 1  E (1)
and the liquidity condition:
D   c
1  c  f
 (2)
Plugging (1) into (2) and into the objective function, we can rewrite the above program
as follows:
li = Max
0c1
fyH + (1  ) yL   1 + E   c (yH + (1  ) yL   1)g (3)
subject to
(1  E   f)  c (1  f) (4)
This program makes clear the trade-o¤ driving the banks cash holding decision. The cost
of holding cash is the foregone return of the long-term asset, which explains why the term
"c (yH + (1  ) yL   1)" is deducted from the banks expected prot. The benet of
holding cash is to provide insurance against the liquidity shock at date 1, which is reected
in Constraint (4). Note that this constraint matters only if f < 1. One unit of cash
at date 0 generates one unit of liquidity at date 1 whereas the amount of liquidity raised
against one unit of long-term asset is f. Clearly, holding cash makes sense only when
f < 1. We make the following assumption to ensure the role of cash in our model:
Assumption 6
f < 1
At the optimum, the bank holds an amount of cash that is just su¢ cient to overcome
the liquidity shock, i.e. cli = max

1 E f
1 f ; 0

. Note that when E is high enough (i.e.
E  1  f), the liquidity shock is low, the bank is liquid even though it holds zero cash.
Hence, the banks expected prot when choosing to be liquid at date 1 is:
li = yH + (1  ) yL   1 + E  max

1  E   f
1  f ; 0

(yH + (1  ) yL   1)
3The superscript "li" refers to liquidity.
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We now turn to the amount of cash the bank holds if it chooses to be illiquid at date
1. The bank problem in this case is written as follows4:
illi = Max
0c1



(1  c) yH   D   c


subject to the break-even condition of short term investors:
D + (1  ) (c+ (1  c) `) = 1  E (5)
and the illiquidity condition:
D   c
1  c > f

Plugging (5) into the objective function, we get:
illi = Max
0c1
fyH + (1  ) `  1 + E   c (yH + (1  ) `  1)g
subject to
(1  E   f) > c (1  f)
Hence, cilli = 0 at the optimum. Since the only benet of cash is to provide insurance
against the liquidity shock, it is intuitive that if the bank decides to be illiquid at date 1,
it will hold zero cash. The banks expected prot when choosing to be illiquid at date 1
is then:
illi = yH + (1  ) `  1 + E
Finally, to determine the optimal cash policy of the bank, we have to compare li and
illi. We see that the condition:
li  illi
is equivalent to
(1  ) yL   (1  ) `  max

1  E   f
1  f ; 0

(yH + (1  ) yL   1) (6)
Note that the LHS of Inequality (6) is the expected loss in value due to early liquidation of
the long-term asset while the RHS represents the cost of buying insurance against liquidity
risk (i.e. holding cash) for the bank. Clearly, the bank chooses to be insured only if the
insurance cost is lower than the loss in the value. Inequality (6) results in a condition on
the banks leverage as follows:
E  (1  f) yH + (1  ) `  1
yH + (1  ) yL   1 = E
 (7)
The following proposition summarizes the characterization of the banks optimal cash
holding policy:
Proposition 1 When the bank is undercapitalized (i.e. E < E), it chooses to be illiquid
4The superscript "illi" refers to illiquidity.
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Figure 3: The banks optimal cash holding policy
and holds zero cash. The bank chooses to be liquid only when it is well capitalized (i.e.
E  E). In that case, the bank holds an amount of cash equal to max

1 E f
1 f ; 0

and
the liquidity coverage ratio (i.e. cD ) is increasing with the leverage.
We graphically represent in Figure 3 the cash holding policy characterized in Propo-
sition 1. We rst observe that the bank holds su¢ cient cash to be insured against the
liquidity shock if and only if the banks capital ratio is high enough. This result is due to
the fact that when the banks capital ratio decreases, the bank holds more debts, which
exposes it to a higher liquidity shock. This higher exposure in turn leads to a higher cost
of insurance. We see clearly in Inequality (7) that the insurance cost is decreasing with
the banks capital ratio E. When this ratio is too low, buying insurance against the liquid-
ity shock becomes too costly, which induces the bank to gamble. The second conclusion
obtained in Proposition 1 concerns the increasing relationship between the liquidity cov-
erage ratio and the leverage of the bank when it is well capitalized. The intuition behind
it is straightforward. Once the bank chooses to be liquid, the amount of cash it holds is
increasing with its exposure to liquidity risk.
Proposition 1 brings out the positive impact that a restriction on the banks leverage
can have on its incentives to manage its liquidity. In the present model, capital require-
ments can perfectly do the job of improving the management of liquidity risk by banks.
As noted in the introduction, although we do not claim that this is a general result, this
insight is itself interesting in the sense that it shows that any proposal concerning a liquid-
ity requirement needs to be jointly considered with the capital regulation in order to avoid
overregulation. Another interesting insight derived from Proposition 1 pertains to the
impact of a decrease in the likelihood of the liquidity shock on the capital ratio threshold:
Corollary 1 The capital ratio threshold Eis decreasing with the probability (1  ) that
the liquidity shock happens.
Corrolary 1 states that the capital ratio threshold increases when the likelihood of the
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shock decreases. Put di¤erently, the capital ratio threshold is higher for the liquidity risk
that has smaller probability of occurrence. Corollary 1 thus implies that it is much more
di¢ cult to induce banks to properly manage the tail risk.
5 Multiple Banks Setting with Asset Sales
In the previous setting, we assume away the possibility that a secondary market for
long-term assets is opened at date 1, which allows banks to sell them when in need of
liquidity. In this section, we examine the consequences of permitting the sales of long-
term assets.
5.1 Environment
We consider a model with three banks, called A;B and C. Bank i (i = A;B;C) has an
amount of equity equal to Ei. Each banks has access to the same investment technologies
and is subject to the same moral hazard problem as described in the previous section. We
assume that the liquidity shock represents a common exposure of three banks: at date 1,
the realization of ~y is the same to all of them. The di¤erence with the previous setup is
that to pay back their short-term debt, banks now have three options instead of two:
(i) The amount of cash held from date 0
(ii) The new debt issued against the date 2 - cash ow generated by the project
(iii) The proceeds from selling their long-term assets.
With regard to the secondary market where banks can sell their asset, we assume, in
accordance with Assumption 3 about the specicity of the banks asset, that potential
purchasers of a banks long-term asset are other banks. Hence, in the present paper, we
distinguish between asset sale and asset liquidation. Asset sale corresponds to the transfer
of the asset from one specialist to the other who has the same ability to redeploy it. As to
asset liquidation, it is equivalent to the transfer of the asset to a non-specialist who can
extract a much lower surplus from the assets than specialist.
In order to characterize the equilibria of the present economy, we proceed as follows: we
rst examine the market for asset sales and analyze how the market price is determined.
Then we study the banks incentives for liquidity holdings. Finally, we investigate the
existence and the main features of di¤erent rational expectation equilibria.
5.2 Borrowing Capacity
As in the basic model, if the high state is realized, all banks can roll over their debt.
If the low state is realized, the maximum borrowing capacity (per unit of long-term asset)
for each bank is f.
13
5.3 Market for Asset Sales
We now analyze the secondary market of long-term assets. For this purpose, we intro-
duce some additional notations as follows:
 i denotes the bank is liquidity demand (per unit of long-term asset) at date 1:
i =
Di   ci
1  ci for i = A;B;C
 p is the unit price of the long-term assets.
 i (i = A;B;C) indicates the fraction of long-term assets sold by bank i to cover its
liquidity need.
 i (i = A;B;C) is the volume of long-term assets acquired by bank i.
A. Demand and Supply of Long-Term Assets
We start with the determination of the individual suppy and demand functions. Since
the maximum funding capacity (per unit of long-term asset) for each bank is f, banks
who have to sell their long-term assets are the ones with  exceeding f. In contrast,
banks that have  lower than or equal to f are in excess of liquidity and thus, can buy
assets.
The fraction of asset i sold by each bank i (i = A;B;C) with i greater than f
 is
determined as follows:
i (1  ci) p+ (1  ci) (1  i)f  Di   ci (8)
In Inequality (8), the LHS is the total liquidity bank i could raise. It is the sum of
respectively the proceeds from selling a fraction i of long-term asset and the liquidity
obtained by issuing new debt against the remaining fraction 1  i. After simplication,
we get:
i = min

1;
i   f
p  f

(9)
Observe that funding liquidity expands with asset sales if and only if the unit price p is
greater than f. We assume for now p  f and will show later that it is indeed the
case. The extent of asset sales is decreasing with the assets price. A bank i will have to
sell all of its existing investment when the price p falls below its liquidity demand i.
With regard to the asset demand i of bank i who has excess liquidity, note that no
bank would acquire assets at a price higher than their expected payo¤. Hence, if p > yL ;
i should be equal to zero. If f
 < p < yL, i is determined as follows:
(1  ci + i) f   (Di   ci)  ip (10)
The LHS of Inequality (10) is the total liquidity available to bank i for asset purchase. It
consists of its spare debt capacity from existing assets, (1  ci) f   (Di   ci), plus the
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liquidity that can be raised against assets to be acquired, if
. After some arrangements,
we have:
i = (1  ci)
f   i
p  f
Notice that if p = f, the liquidity raised against assets to be acquired is su¢ cient to
pay for the assets, which implies that the demand for the assets is innitely high. To
summarize, the long-term assets demand function of bank i who has i lower than or
equal to f is as follows:
i(i; p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if p > yL
(1  ci) f
 i
p f if f
 < p < yL
any value between 0 and (1  ci) f
 i
p f if p = yL
1 if p = f
(11)
B. Unit Price of Long-Term Assets
Now, we turn to investigate the unit price of long-term assets. Because of limited
market participation, the price is determined by the amount of liquidity available in the
market for asset purchases, which in turn depends on the bankscash holding decision at
date 0. In this section, we characterize the equilibrium price for all possible distributions
of liquidity in the banking system at date 1. In the following, i; j and k can be either A;B
or C.
(i) i  j  k  f: All banks are liquid and can roll over their debt. Therefore, there
is no asset trading at date 1.
(ii) i  f < j  k: Bank i is liquid while banks j and k have to sell some of their
long-term assets if the low state is realized. From the individual demand and supply
functions characterized in respectively (11) and (9), we can compute the total supply
S(p) as well as the total demand D(p) as follows:
S(p) = (1  cj)min

1;
j   f
p  f

+ (1  ck)min

1;
k   f
p  f

and
D(p) = (1  ci) f
   i
p  f for p < yL
The equilibrium price satises the market-clearing condition:
ED(p)  D(p)  S(p) = 0
If excess demand ED(p) is positive for all p < yL; then in the equilibrium p = yL.
There exists three subcases:
(ii.1) f  p  j  k: We have:
min

1;
j   f
p  f

= 1 and min

1;
k   f
p  f

= 1
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This case corresponds to the situation where both banks j and k cannot raise
enough liquidity even when they sell all of their long-term assets. They are
thus closed at date 1. Their assets are sold by their debtholders to bank i. The
excess demand ED(p) is then computed as follows:
ED(p) = (1  ci) f
   i
p  f   (1  cj + 1  ck)
Hence, the condition that excess demand be zero leads to the following rela-
tionship:
p = f +
(1  ci) (f   i)
2  cj   ck (12)
which implies that the equilibrium price is given by:
p = min

f +
(1  ci) (f   i)
2  cj   ck ; yL

(13)
(ii.2) f < j < p  k: In this case, bank j can overcome the liquidity shock
after selling a fraction j , which is strictly less than 1, of its long-term assets.
However, bank k has to sell all of its long-term assets and thus, will be closed
at date 1 following the occurrence of the liquidity shock. Zero excess demand
is equivalent to:
ED(p) =
(1  ci) (f   i)
p  f  
 
(1  cj)
 
j   f

p  f + (1  ck)
!
= 0
Therefore, the equilibrium price is represented as follows:
p = min
 
f +
(f   i) (1  ci) 
 
j   f

(1  cj)
1  ck ; yL
!
(14)
(ii.3) f < j  k < p: Both banks j and k survive the liquidity shock and
continue to operate at date 1. The excess demand function is given by:
ED(p) =
(1  ci) (f   i)
p  f  
(1  cj)
 
j   f

+ (1  ck) (k   f)
p  f
We see that in this case, the equilibrium price is determined by a positive excess
demand condition as follows:
(1  ci) (f   i)
p  f 
(1  cj)
 
j   f

+ (1  ck) (k   f)
p  f (15)
which means that in the equilibrium the price p equals to yL.
(iii) i  j  f < k: Two banks i and j are liquid whereas bank k is illiquid and
must sell its long-term assets at date 1 if the low state is realized. Similarly to Case
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(ii), the total supply and total demand are computed as follows:
S(p) = (1  ck)min

1;
k   f
p  f

D(p) = (1  ci) f
   i
p  f + (1  cj)
f   j
p  f for p < yL
There are two subcases:
(iii.1) f < p  k: Bank k has to sell all of its long-term assets and then, is closed
at date 1. The equilibrium price is given by:
p = min
 
f +
(f   i) (1  ci) +
 
f   j

(1  cj)
1  ck ; yL
!
(16)
(iii.2) f < k < p: Bank k survives the liquidity shock. As in Case (ii.3), the
price is at it frictionless value of yL and the positive excess demand condition
is as follows:
(1  ci) (f   i) + (1  cj)
 
f   j

p  f 
(1  ck) (k   f)
p  f (17)
(iv) f < i  j  k: All banks are illiquid. Therefore, at date 1, no bank is able to
absorb the assets put for sales, which implies that long-term assets are transfered to
non-specialists. In other words, at date 1, all banks are closed and their investment
is liquidated at the value `.
From these representations of the equilibrium price, several observations can be made.
First, we see that the price of long-term assets never falls below f(as remarked in (9)).
This is because the buyer banks can always raise f of liquidity against each additional
unit of asset they purchase. Typically, the equilibrium price is determined by the sum
of f and an other term that captures the e¤ect of spare liquidity in the system. Let
us look at, for instance, Equation (12) in Case (ii.1). The spare liquidity in the system
is represented by (1  ci) (f   i), the excess liquidity held by bank i. Whether or not
the price deviates from the assets value depends on the magnitude of this spare liquidity.
If it is high enough, the RHS of Equation (12) is then greater than yL, which implies
that excess demand is positive for all p < yL. Hence, the price equals to the assets
expected payo¤, i.e. p = yL (see (13)). In the other case, the price is strictly less than
the assets value, which reects a re-sale discount. The same observations apply to Cases
(ii.2) and (iii.1). For Cases (ii.3) and (iii.2), we see that the market should either be in
excess demand or in excess supply. If the market is in excess supply, then the price should
equal f, which violates the conditions characterizing these two cases. Therefore, Cases
(ii.3) and (iii.2) only occur when the spare liquidity in the system is high enough so that
the equilibrium price is at its frictionless value of yL. These observations lead to the
following lemma:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium price of long-term assets is represented by either (13) or (14)
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or (15) or (16) or (17), depending on the distribution of liquidity in the banking system.
It has the following properties:
1. It is increasing in the funding liquidity of the long-term asset.
2. It is lower than the assets value when the spare liquidity in the banking system is
low.
5.4 BanksIncentives for Liquidity Holdings
Given the above representations of the asset price, we are now equipped to analyse
the bankscash holding decisions. From a date 0 perspective, each bank must choose how
much cash it holds on its balance sheet. Its decision is a¤ected by its expectation about
the price of long-term assets at date 1, which depends on other banksdecisions. To gain
insights on the banks incentives to hold cash, let us rst formulate in this section the
program that determines a bank is cash holding decision given the choices of two other
banks j and k. Then, we will examine how the possibility of acquiring asset cheap a¤ects
the banksmotivation for holding cash.
A. The BanksOptimization Problem
We rst write the program that determines the amount of cash bank i will hold if
choosing to be liquid. Notice that its decision will depend on whether or not it has the
opportunity to purchase some long-term assets at date 1. Hence, we distinguish between
two situations: with and without asset trading at date 1:
When two other banks j and k also choose to be liquid, no long-term assets are
put for sale at date 1 by other banks. Bank is expected prot if choosing to be liquid is
then computed as follows5:

li_ntr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]



(1  ci) yH   Di   ci


+ (1  ) 

(1  ci) yL   Di   ci


subject to the break-even condition of short-term investors:
Di + (1  )Di = 1  Ei (18)
and the liquidity constraint:
i  f (19)
After subtracting the break-even condition from the objective function, we can rewrite the
above program as follows:
Program }li_ntr

li_ntr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]
fyH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)g (20)
5 In what follows, the superscripts "li_ntr", "li_tr", "illi_ntr" and "illi_tr" refers respectively to
"liquidity and no trading", "liquidity and trading", "illiquidity and no trading" and "illiquidity and trad-
ing".
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subject to
ci  1  Ei   f

1  f
When at least one of the two other banks chooses to be illiquid, some assets will
be put for sale at date 1 in the secondary market, which gives bank i the occasion to
buy some assets if it has available liquidity. Given that bank is demand for the asset is
represented by i dened by (11), bank is expected prot if choosing to be liquid is thus:

li_tr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]



(1  ci) yH   Di   ci


+ (1  ) 

(1  ci + i) yL  
Di   ci + pi


(21)
subject to the two same constraints (18) and (19).
The rst bracket in (21) is simply what bank i gets in case of success at date 2 if a high
state is realized at date 1. It is the di¤erence between the projects cash ow and the face
value of the new debt issued at date 1. The second bracket is the banks prot following
the realization of the low state. Note that at date 1, when the low state is observed, bank
i purchases a volume i of assets put for sales by illiquid banks, which means that it holds
1   ci + i units of long-term assets after the trade. To pay for the transaction, bank i
has to borrow an additional amount equal to pi, which explains why the face value of its
new debts is now Di ci+pi . After some rearrangements, we get:
Program }li_tr

li_tr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
+ (1  ) i (yL   p)
)
(22)
subject to
ci  1  Ei   f

1  f (23)
As for the program determining the amount of cash bank i holds if choosing to be
illiquid, there are also two cases:
If both other banks choose to be illiquid, bank i will have to liquidate its long-term
investment when the low state is realized at date 1. Its expected prot is then:

illi_ntr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]



(1  ci) yH   Di   ci


subject to the break-even condition of short-term investors:
D + (1  ) (ci + (1  ci) `) = 1  Ei (24)
and the illiquidity condition:
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f (25)
Again, subtracting (24) from the objective function, the above program becomes:
Program }illi_ntr
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
illi_ntr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]
fyH + (1  ) `  1 + E   c (yH + (1  ) `  1)g (26)
subject to:
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
If at least one of two other banks choose to be liquid, bank i can sell its long-term
assets to liquid banks in the secondary market when it needs liquidity. Its expected prot
is now computed as follows:

illi_tr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]
8<: 
h
(1  ci) yH   Di ci
i
+(1  )max


h
(1  ci) (1  i) yL   Di ci (1 ci)ip
i
; 0
 9=; (27)
where i is dened by (9) and subject to
Di + (1  )min [Di; (ci + (1  ci)ip+ (1  ci) (1  i) f] = 1  Ei
and
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
The second term in (27) is the bank is expected prot following the realization of the low
state. Note that if bank i is illiquid, at date 1 in the low state, it will sell a fraction i of
its long-term assets and ends up with the remaining fraction 1 i. When this term takes
a strictly positive value, only a part of the investment is sold and thus, bank i survives the
liquidity shock. Otherwise, bank i has to sell all of its investment and its expected prot
is equal, by limited liability, to zero. After simplications, we obtain:
Program }illi_tr

illi_tr
i = Max
ci2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ci)i (yL   p)
)
(28)
subject to
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
B. Speculative Motive of Holding Cash
To shed light on the banksmotivation for holding cash that stems from the opportunity
to acquire other banksasset, we compare two Programs }li_ntr and }li_tr. We see that
the possibility of acquiring other banksassets at date 1, which happens with probability
(1  ), generates an additional prot of i (yL   p) to the liquid bank i. We refer to it
as trading prot and denote it by TPi. The rst remark is that TP is strictly positive
if and only if p < yL. In other words, the option to buy assets a¤ects the bankscash
holding incentives only when assets are traded at re-sale price. As a mean to analyse the
e¤ects of one additional unit of cash held by bank i on its trading prot, we compute the
rst derivative of TPi with respect to ci as follows:
dTPi
dci
= (yL   p) di
dci
  i
dp
dci
(29)
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As long as p < yL, we have:
di
dci
=
1  f
p  f  
i
p  f
dp
dci
which implies that (29) yields:
dTPi
dci
= (yL   p) 1  f

p  f  

(yL   p) i
p  f + i

dp
dci
(30)
Observe that one additional unit of cash held by bank i has two e¤ects on the trading
prot. The positive e¤ect, captured by the rst term in (30), is the impact on the bank is
excess liquidity available to acquire the asset: one more unit of cash increases the excess
liquidity by 1  f, which allows bank i to buy more assets for a given price p. However,
one additional unit of cash held by bank i will also increase the asset price, which decreases
the volume of assets bank i can buy for a given level of excess liquidity as well as the prot
per unit of asset acquired. The optimal amount of cash the liquid bank i holds, when it
expects to have the opportunity to purchase some assets at date 1, is then determined by
the following FOC:(   (yH + (1  ) yL   1) + (1  )dTPidci +  = 0


ci   1 Ei f1 f

= 0 and   0 (31)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint (23). We state
in the following proposition the amount of cash bank i holds when it chooses to be liquid.
For this purpose, we dene the following variable :
 =
(1  ) (1  f) (yL   f)
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + (1  ) (1  f) (32)
Proposition 2 In a model with three banks, if a bank i chooses to be liquid, its cash
holdings are as follows:
1. Given that two other banks choose to be liquid:
c
li_ntr
i =
1  Ei   f
1  f
2. Given that at least one of two other banks chooses to be illiquid:
a) If both banks j and k choose to be illiquid or as long as p = yL:
c
li_tr
i =
1  Ei   f
1  f
b) In the other case, i.e. among two other banks, one bank chooses to be liquid, say
bank j, one bank chooses to be illiquid and is closed, say bank k:
c
li_tr
i = max
"
1  Ei   f
1  f ;
1  Ei   f
1  f +
p
 (1  ck) "j   "j
1  f
#
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where "j is the excess liquidity held by bank j, i.e.
"j = (1  cj)
 
f   j

Proof. Appendix
Some more intuitions underlying Proposition 2 are worth providing here.
First, as we already noted, the possibility of acquiring assets provides banks with an
additional reason to hold cash only when assets are traded at re-sale price. If banks
expect that p = yL, the trading prot is zero and banks hold cash only for insuring
themself against the liquidity shock, which explains why the liquid bank i just holds the
minimum amount of cash, i.e. ci =
1 Ei f
1 f , when it expects p = yL.
Second, even when the trading prot is strictly positive, bank i still decides to hold
a minimum amount of cash if it expects all other banks to be illiquid. The reason is that
when bank i is the only potential buyer of assets, one additional unit of cash held by bank
i will have a strong e¤ect on the price, which compensates or even outweigh the e¤ect on
its excess liquidity. Hence, its trading prot is decreasing with its cash holdings.
Third, when the liquid bank i expects to have competitors in the secondary market
of the asset, the e¤ect of its cash holding on the price is weaker. As a consequence, bank
i may hold more than the minimum required amount if its competitorscash holdings are
low.
5.5 Equilibria
We study now the existence and the main features of rational expectation equilibria.
We focus on pure strategy equilibria, which can be one of the following types: (i) all three
banks are liquid; (ii) one bank is liquid and two banks are illiquid; (iii) two banks are
liquid and one bank is illiquid; (iv) all three banks are illiquid. We will characterize the
conditions on the banks leverage under which each of those equilibria exists as well as
their properties.
Equilibrium denition: A quadruple (cA; c

B; c

C ; p
) is a rational expection equilibrium
if and only if:
(1) ci is the optimal cash holdings of bank i (i = A;B;C) given p

(2) p is the equilibrium price induced by the choices (cA; c

B; c

C)
Before proceeding with the characterization, we dene the following thresholds:
E1 = (1  f) yH + (1  ) f
   1
yH + (1  ) yL   1
E2 = E1   (1  f) 
2

1
1  f  
1  
yH + (1  ) yL   1

E3 = E1   (1  f)
1 
4
 
yL   f   2

yH + (1  ) yL   1
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E4 = E1   (1  f)
1 
2 (yL   f)
yH + (1  ) yL   1
E5 = (1  f) yH + (1  ) `  1  2 (1  ) (yL   f
)
yH + (1  ) yL   1
where  is dened by Expression (32). It is easily to check that E1 > E2 > E3 > E4 > E5.
We begin by stating the characteristics of two extreme equilibria where all banks choose
either to be liquid or to be illiquid.
Proposition 3 In a model with three banks:
(a) An equilibrium where all banks choose to be liquid exists if and only if
Ei  E1 for all i = A;B;C
In this equilibrium, each bank holds an amount of cash equal to
ci =
1  Ei   f
1  f for all i
(b) An equilibrium where all banks choose to be illiquid exists if and only if
Ei < E5 for all i = A;B;C
In this equilibrium, each bank holds a zero amount of cash, i.e. ci = 0 for all i. All
banks will be closed at date 1 if the low state is realized.
Proof. Appendix
To gain some intuition on the construction of those equilibria, consider for instance
the equilibrium where all banks choose to be liquid. From Program }li_ntr, we see clearly
that the optimal amount of cash each bank i holds if choosing to be liquid given that two
other banks also choose to be liquid is equal to 1 Ei f

1 f . Next, we have to make sure
that no bank has incentives to deviate. Evidently no bank should deviate by holding more
than 1 Ei f

1 f . If a bank i deviates by holding less, i.e. by choosing to be illiquid, we
could show that its expected prot is as follows:6
dei = yH + (1  )f   1 + Ei
Therefore, to ensure no deviation, the following condition must be satised for all i:
yH+(1  ) yL 1+Ei 1  Ei   f

1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)  yH+(1  ) f
 1+Ei
which yields
Ei  E1 for all i
Now, we turn to the equilibrium where one bank is liquid and two banks are illiquid.
6The superscript "de" refers to deviation.
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Proposition 4 In a model with three banks, an equilibrium where one bank chooses to be
liquid and two banks choose to be illiquid exists if and only if in the banking system, one
bank has capital ratio greater than E5 while two other banks have capital ratio lower than
E4. In this equilibrium, at date 0, the liquid bank holds an amount of cash:
c =
1  E   f
1  f
whereas each illiquid bank holds zero cash. At date 1, two illiquid banks are closed if the
low state is realized. Their long-term assets are sold to the liquid bank at a re-sale price:
p = f < yL
Proof. Appendix
The construction of this equilibrium is similar to that of two equilibria characterized in
Proposition 3. We rst determine the amount of cash each bank holds in the equilibrium.
Then we establish the conditions under which no bank has incentives to deviate. As shown
in Part 2(a) of Proposition 2, when two other banks choose to be illiquid, the bank who
chooses to be liquid will hold 1 E f

1 f as cash. Concerning the banks that choose to be
illiquid, their cash holdings are determined by Program }illi_tr. Thanks to the observation
that the liquid bank holds an amount of cash that is just su¢ cient to overcome the liquidity
shock, we know that the liquidity available in the market for asset purchases will be the
one raised against the assets to be acquired. As a result, the asset price equals f, which
implies that illiquid banks must sell their entire investment. Replace p = f and  = 1 in
the program }illi_tr, we see that the amount of cash illiquid banks carry on their balance
sheet is zero.
With regard to the no-deviation conditions, we could prove that if the liquid bank i
deviates, its expected prot is
dei = yH + (1  )`  1 + E
For the illiquid banks j and k, their expected prot in case of deviation is, for m = j; k
dem = yH + (1  )yL   1 + Em  
1  Em   f
1  f (yH + (1  )yL   1)
+
1
2
(1  ) (yL   f)
To guarantee that no banks deviate, the banks leverage must satisfy the two following
conditions:
Ei  E5
and
Ej  E4 and Ek  E4
The nal pure strategy equilibrium we would like to characterize is the one where two
banks choose to be liquid and one bank chooses to be illiquid. There exists two equilibria
of this type.
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Proposition 5 In a model with three banks, there exists two equilibria where two banks
choose to be liquid and one bank chooses to be illiquid. They di¤er in the amount of cash
held by liquid banks.
(a) In one equilibrium, at date 0, each liquid bank holds an amount of cash:
c =
1  E   f + 4
1  f
and the illiquid bank holds zero cash. At date 1, the illiquid bank is closed if the low
state is realized. Its long-term assets are sold by its debtholders to two liquid banks
at a re-sale price:
p = f +

2
< yL
This equilibrium exists if and only if in the banking system, two banks have capital
ratio greater than E3 while the other bank has capital ratio lower than E2.
(b) In the other equilibrium, at date 0, each liquid bank holds an amount of cash:
c =
1  E   f
1  f
and the illiquid bank holds zero cash. At date 1, the illiquid bank is closed if the low
state is realized. Its long-term assets are sold by its debtholders to two liquid banks
at a re-sale price:
p = f < yL
This equilibrium exists if and only if in the banking system, two banks have capital
ratio greater than E4 while the other bank has capital ratio lower than E1.
Proof. Appendix
To construct those equilibria, we start with the observation that an equilibrium where
p = yL cannot exist. Indeed, if a liquid bank expects that p = yL, it will hold an
amount of cash that is just su¢ cient to overcome the liquidity shock, i.e.  = f, which
implies that (f   ) (1  c) = 0. Accordingly, the excess demand condition (17) cannot
be satised, or put di¤erently no equilibrium where p = yL exists. Therefore, in the
equilibrium where two banks are liquid and one bank is illiquid, the equilibrium price
should be represented by (16). Due to Part 2(b) of Proposition 2, we know that the
optimal cash holdings of two banks i and j who choose to be liquid in the equilibrium are
determined by the following system:(
"i = max
 
0;
p
 (1  ck) "j   "j

"j = max

0;
p
 (1  ck) "i   "i
 (33)
where "m; the excess liquidity held by bank m;m = i; j; is dened by:
"m = (f
   m) (1  cm)
25
Note that System (33) has two solutions:
"i = "j = 0 or "i = "j =
 (1  ck)
4
As the illiquid bank k will choose to hold zero cash, i.e. ck = 0, we obtain that in the
equilibrium, two liquid banks either hold:
ci = c

j =
1  E   f + 4
1  f
or hold:
ci = c

j =
1  E   f
1  f
Regarding the no-deviation conditions, we nd that for the rst equilibrium, liquid
banks m, m = i; j, never deviate if and only if:
Em +
Em   4
1  f (yH + (1  )yL   1) +
1  
2

yL   f   
2

 yH + (1  )f   1 + Em + (1  ) 
8
which is equivalent to
Em  E3 for m = i; j
As of illiquid bank k, to ensure that it will not deviate, the following condition must be
satised:
yH + (1  )f   1 + Ek + (1  ) 
2
 Ek +
Ek +

2
1  f (yH + (1  )yL   1)
which yields
Ek  E2
For the second equilibrium, equivalent conditions are respectively
Em +
Em
1  f (yH + (1  )yL   1) + (1  )
1
2
(yL   f)
 yH + (1  )f   1 + Em
and
yH + (1  )f   1 + Ek  Ek + Ek
1  f (yH + (1  )yL   1)
After simplications, we get
Em  E4 for m = i; j
and
Ek  E1
Figure 4 summarizes the equilibria described in Propositions 3, 4 and 5. Notice that
the condition on banks leverage characterized in these Propositions cover all possible
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Figure 4: Summary of Equilibria.
distribution of leverage in a banking system consisting of three banks. In other words,
any possible distribution of leverage in a system of three banks corresponds to one of the
4 above-mentioned pure strategy equilibria that di¤er in the number of banks that are
in trouble following a liquidity shock7. The most interesting observation derived from
Figure 4 is that a more leveraged banking system is more vulnerable to a liquidity shock.
Especially, a system composed of banks that opereate with very high leverage could entirely
collapse following the materialization of a liquidity shock. If we dene a liquidity crisis
being the situation where a large number of banks are closed as a consequence of a liquidity
shock, we could interpret the two equilibria characterized in Part (b) of Proposition 3 and
in Proposition 4 as the cases where a liquidity crisis occurs. The equilibria characterized
in Proposition 5 can be seen as the case where there is individual bank problem in the
system. A totally healthy banking system corresponds to the equilibrium described in
Part (a) of Proposition 3.
5.6 Discussion
In this section, we rst discuss the analogy of our predicted pattern of liquidity crises
with the recent nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Then we discuss the role of public liquidity
support.
A. Leverage and Liquidity Crises
7 In the situation characterized in Part (a) of Proposition 5, there exists 2 equilibria. However, in both
equilibria, the number of banks that fail is the same.
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Figure 5: Evidence on banksleverage (Source: Figure 6b in Acharya et al 2012)
Although the present setup is highly stylized and abstracts from many institutional
aspects of nancial system, it does provide interesting insights into the unfolding of the
recent crisis. As noted above, our model predicts that a banking system where banks are
highly leveraged can be prone to liquidity crises. The pattern of the crises is typical: High
leverage results in low ex-ante liquidity holdings of banks. Then, when a liquidity shock
is realized, many banks have trouble in honoring their debt obligations and the banks
assets are sold only at re-sale prices, which causes the failure of banks that are in need of
liquidity. This pattern is consistent with what was observed during the 2007-2009 crisis.
Indeed, many analyses show that during the period running up to the crisis, the bank-
ing system was characterized by both high leverage and low liquidity holdings. Acharya
et al. (2012) report that in the period of 2000 - 2007, bank capital structures were look-
ing increasingly levered. Figure 5 that is taken from their study represents the leverage
ratios of the 25 large US nancial rms. We observe that the total asset/common equity
ratio of both commercial and investment banks increased signicantly from 2000 to 2007.
Precisely, for commercial banks, it grew from 15:0 in the rst quarter of 2000 to 22:51 in
the fourth quarter of 2007 whereas for investment banks, it raised from 26:90 to 35:85.
Furthermore, Acharya et al. (2012) also pointed out that the increase in the debt nanc-
ing was primarily realized via the use of short-term debt, which is compatible with our
assumption about the dominance of short-term component in banksleverage.
Regarding the banksliquidity holdings, Figure 6, taken from Berrospide 2013, show
that from 2005 to 2008, the liquid assets/total assets ratio for U.S. commercial banks de-
creases constantly from around 23% to around 18%. This combination of high short-term
leverage and low liquid asset holdings were source of many serious liquidity problem expe-
rienced by banks following the revelation of the increase in subprime mortgage defaults.
Many banks were unable to roll-over their asset-backed commercial papers. The market
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Figure 6: Evidence on U.S. commercial banks liquidity holdings (source: Figure 1 in
Berrospide 2013)
prices of various banksassets were signicantly below what plausible fundamentals would
suggest they should be.
B. Public Liquidity Support
This paper highlights that highly leveraged banks have little incentives to prudently
manage their liquidity risk, which make them vulnerable to shocks that tend to cripple
their funding capacity. Can public liquidity support be solution in these situations? We
have to distinguish between two aspects: one is its ability to avoid the liquidity crises and
the second is its impact on the banksex-ante incentives to manage their liquidity risk.
Note rst that public intervention via lender of last resort cannot help to solve the
liquidity problem banks face at date 1. Since banks borrowing capacity is saturated,
lending more to the banks will violate the incentive compatibility condition, which induces
banks to switch to bad assets. Other forms of public support such as providing liquidity in
exchange of ownership or by acquiring the bankslong-term assets can prevent the liquidity
crises from happening in this simple setup. However, in more elaborate setups where there
is uncertainty about the bankssolvency and/or adverse selection problem concerning the
banksassets., the design of public intervention is a complex issue. Moreover, if banks
anticipate that they will receive liquidity support at date 1, their incentives to hold liquid
assets to self-insure at date 0 will be destroyed. In other words, although public liquidity
support may, in some situations, help to mitigate the liquidity problem, it is detrimental
to the banksex-ante incentives.
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6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of banks liquidity management that endogenizes the
magnitude of the banksexposure to the liquidity shock. The model helps to clarify the
linkage between the banks leverage and their incentives to manage their liquidity. We
nd that an individual bank tends to prudently manage its liquidity risk only if it is well
capitalized. We also show that a banking system that is composed of highly leveraged bank
can be prone to liquidity crises. In our model, the crises have pattern that is analogous
with the recent crisis.
We believe that the present framework provides a useful workhorse for future research
that helps to deepen our understanding of the impact of banksleverage on their incentives
for liquidity management. One promising extension would be to endogenize the banks
choice of leverage. This would allow to analyse the e¤ects of bankscapital on their e¤ort
in reducing the likelihood of a liquidity shock. Another interesting extension would be to
take into account the role of long-term debt and ask whether holding liquid assets and
funding by long-term debt are perfect substitute from a liquidity risk perspective.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1: From Program }li_ntr;it is evident that cli_ntri =
1 Ei f
1 f .
Part 2: If p = yL, we have TPi = 0, which clearly impliest that c
li_tr
i =
1 Ei f
1 f .
When p is strictly less than yL, we just need to compute the rst derivative of TPi with
respect to ci for di¤erent representations of the equilibrium price p given in Section 5.3.
(+) If p = f + 1 ci2 cj ck (f
   i), we have:
dp
dci
=
1  f
2  cj   ck
Hence, we get:
dTPi
dci
= (yL   p) 1  f

p  f   i

yL   p
p  f + 1

1  f
2  cj   ck
or
dTPi
dci
= (yL   p) 1  f

p  f   i
yL   f
p  f
1  f
2  cj   ck (34)
Note that when p = f + 1 ci2 cj ck (f
   i), we can compute i as follows:
i =
(1  ci) (f   i)
p  f = 2  cj   ck (35)
Substitue (35) into (34), we get:
dTPi
dci
= (yL   p) 1  f

p  f   (2  cj   ck)
yL   f
p  f
1  f
2  cj   ck
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or
dTPi
dci
=   (1  f) < 0 (36)
(+) If p = f + (f   i) 1 ci1 ck  
 
j   f
 1 cj
1 ck , we obtain:
dp
dci
=
1  f
1  ck
Therefore,
dTPi
dci
= (yL   p) 1  f

p  f   i

yL   p
p  f + 1

1  f
1  ck
After some similar arrangements as above, we get:
dTPi
dci
=   (1  f)  1  f

p  f (yL   f
)
 
j   f

(1  cj)
(f   i) (1  ci) 
 
j   f

(1  cj)
< 0
(+) If p = f+(f   i) 1 ci1 ck +
 
f   j
 1 cj
1 ck , similarly to the previous cases, after
some computations, we obtain:
dTPi
dci
=   (1  f) + (1  f) yL   f

p  f
 
f   j

(1  cj)
(f   i) (1  ci) +
 
f   j

(1  cj)
Hence, the FOC (31) implies that:
(1  ) (1  f) yL   f

p  f
 
f   j

(1  cj)
(f   i) (1  ci) +
 
f   j

(1  cj)
 yH + (1  ) yL   1 + (1  ) (1  f)
or

 
f   j

(1  cj) (1  ck)
(f   i) (1  ci) +
 
f   j

(1  cj)
2  1
which is equivalent to:
(f   i) (1  ci) 
q
 (1  ck) "j   "j (37)
Therefore, if
p
 (1  ck) "j   "j  0, we have:
ci =
1  Ei   f
1  f +
p
 (1  ck) "j   "j
1  f
Otherwise, the liquidity constraint is binding, i.e.
ci =
1  Ei   f
1  f
B Proof of Proposition 3
Part (a): As already shown in Proposition 2, given that two other banks choose to
be liquid, if a bank i chooses to be liquid, it will hold ci =
1 Ei f
1 f . Now we have to
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check that no bank has incentives to deviate. Clearly, given that other banks are liquid,
no bank has incentives to deviate by holding more than 1 Ei f

1 f . Under which conditions
they will not deviate by holding less? If a bank i deviates by choosing to be illiquid, its
expected prot is as follows8:
dei = 
illi_tr
i = Max0ci1
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ci)i (yL   p)
)
subject to
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
Since two other banks hold an amount of cash that is just su¢ cient to overcome the
liquidity shock, their spare debt capacity from existing assets is zero. Hence, the liquidity
available for asset purchase comes from the liquidity raised against assets to be acquired,
which implies that p = f. Therefore, the bank is expected prot in case of deviation is:
dei = yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ei
Bank i will not deviate as long as the following condition is satised:
yH+(1  ) yL 1+Ei 1  Ei   f

1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)  yH+(1  ) f
 1+Ei
which is equivalent to
Ei  E1
Part (b): In the equilibrium, the expected prot for each bank i is

illi_ntr
i = yH + (1  ) `  1 + Ei
If a bank i deviates by choosing to be liquid, its expected prot is computed as follows:
dei = 
li_tr
i = Maxci
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
+ (1  ) i (yL   p)
)
(38)
subject to
ci  1  Ei   f

1  f (39)
As shown in Part (2) of Proposition 2, bank i will hold cdei =
1 Ei f
1 f , which implies
p = f. Hence,
dei = yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei  
1  Ei   f
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
+ (1  ) 2 (yL   f)
8The superscript "de" refers to deviation.
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The condition for no deviation is the following
yH + (1  ) `  1 + Ei  dei
which yields:
Ei  E5
C Proof of Proposition 4
We rst determine the optimal amount of cash each bank holds in the equilibrium.
Then, we characterize the conditions under which no bank has incentives to deviate.
 Equilibrium cash holdings of the liquid bank: As shown in part 2(a) of Proposition
2, if two other banks choose to be illiquid, a bank i who chooses to be liquid will
hold 1 Ei f

1 f as cash.
 Equilibrium cash holdings of illiquid banks: Consider a bank j who chooses to be
illiquid in the equilibrium. Its cash holdings are determined by Program }illi_tr:

illi_tr
j = Max
cj2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ej   cj (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  cj)j (yL   p)
)
subject to
cj <
1  Ej   f
1  f
Since the liquid bank i just holds a minimum amount of cash, i.e. f   i = 0,
the liquidity available to buy assets comes from the liquidity raised against assets
to be acquired. As a consequence, the equilibrium price equals f, which implies
that if bank j chooses to be illiquid, it will be closed at date 1. The program that
determines its cash holdings can be rewritten as follows:

illi_tr
j = Max
cj2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ej   cj (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  cj) (yL   f)
)
subject to
cj <
1  Ej   f
1  f
As the objective function is decreasing with cj , in the equilibrium the illiquid banks
hold zero cash.
To summarize, in the equilibrium, the liquid bank i holds an amount of cash equal to
1 Ei f
1 f while two illiquid banks j and k hold zero cash. At date 1, if the low state is
realized, two illiquid banks j and k sell all of their investment to bank i at price equal
to f. Bank i thus acquires two units of long-term assets. Its expected prot in the
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equilibrium is as follows:

li_tr
i = yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei  
1  Ei   f
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
+2 (1  ) (yL   f)
The expected prot of each illiquid bank in the equilibrium is:

illi_tr
j = yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ej
and

illi_tr
k = yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ek
 No-deviation condition for the liquid bank i: If bank i deviates by choosing to be
illiquid, since two other banks are also illiquid, bank is expected prot is dened by
Program }illi_ntr. Clearly, if deviating, bank i will hold zero cash and has expected
prot equal to:
dei = yH + (1  ) `  1 + Ei
Hence, bank i will never deviate if and only if the following condition is satised:

li_tr
i  dei
or equivalently
Ei  E5
 No-deviation condition for illiquid banks j and k: Consider for instance bank j: If
it deviates by choosing to be liquid, its cash holdings are determined by Program
}li_tr:

li_tr
j = Max
cj2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ej   cj (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
+ (1  ) j (yL   p)
)
(40)
subject to
cj  1  Ej   f

1  f
Since the other liquid bank, bank i, just holds a minimum amount of cash, from the
price representations (16) and (17), we have:
p =
(
f + (1  cj)
 
f   j

if (1  cj)
 
f   j

< 1  Ek   f
yL if (1  cj)
 
f   j
  1  Ek   f
Clearly, bank j should never choose cj such that p = yL. If p = f+(1  cj)
 
f   j

,
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we compute the rst derivative of the objective function in (40) as follows:
@
@cj
=   (yH + (1  ) yL   1) + (1  ) (1  f
) (yL   p)
p  f
 (1  ) j (1  f
) (yL   p)
(p  f)2   (1  ) j (1  f
)
After simplications, we get
@
@cj
=   (yH + (1  ) yL   1)  (1  ) (1  f) < 0
Thus, if deviating, bank j will hold cj =
1 Ej f
1 f , which means f
   j = 0.
Consequently, p = f, j =
1
2 and the bank js expected prot in case of deviation
is:
dej = yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ej  
1  Ej   f
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
+
1
2
(1  ) (yL   f)
Therefore, the no-deviation condition for bank j is as follows:

illi_tr
j  dej
or
Ej  E4
D Proof of Proposition 5
As above, the proof proceeds in two steps. First we determine the amount of cash each
bank holds in the equilibrium. Then we characterize the condition under which no bank
has incentives to deviate.
 Equilibrium cash holdings of liquid banks: Consider two banks i and j who choose
to be liquid in the equilibrium. Since no equilibrium where p = yL exists, as shown
in Section 5.3, the equilibrium price is represented as follows:
p = f + (f   i)
1  ci
1  ck +
 
f   j
 1  cj
1  ck
As established in Inequality (37), the cash holdings of bank i are determined as
follows:
"i = max

0;
q
 (1  ck) "j   "j

(41)
The same argument is applied to bank j, which means:
"j = max(0;
p
 (1  ck) "i   "i) (42)
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The system of two equations (41) to (42) has two solutions:
"i = "j =
 (1  ck)
4
or
"i = "j = 0
which implies:
ci = c

j =
1  E   f + 4
1  f
or
ci = c

j =
1  E   f
1  f
 Equilibrium cash holdings of illiquid bank : Consider bank k who chooses to be illiq-
uid in the equilibrium, its equilibrium cash holdings are determined by Program
}illi_tr. As already noted, an equilibrium where p = yL cannot exist. Hence, in the
equilibrium, k = 1 and the bank ks problem becomes
Max
ck
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ek   ck (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ck) (yL   p)
)
(43)
subject to
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
1 Ek (1 )(ck+(1 ck)p)
   ck
1  ck > p
and
p = f +
"i + "j
1  ck
It is easily to check that the objective function of the above problem is decreasing
with ck. Hence, in the equilibrium, illiquid bank k holds zero cash.
In summary, there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, each liquid bank i and j
hold an amount of cash equal to
1 E f+ 
4
1 f and illiquid bank k holds zero cash. At date
1, if the low state is realized, bank k sells all of its investment to two liquid banks at price
equal to f + 2 . The expected prot of each bank is as follows:
lim = Em +
Em   4
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1) + (1  )
1
2

yL   f   
2

for m = i; j
and
illik = yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ek + (1  )

2
In the other equilibrium, each liquid bank i and j hold an amount of cash equal to 1 E f

1 f
and illiquid bank k holds zero cash. At date 1, if the low state is realized, bank k sells all
of its investment to two liquid banks at price equal to f. The expected prot of each
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bank is as follows:
lim = Em +
Em
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1) + (1  )
1
2
(yL   f) for m = i; j
and
illik = yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ek
Now we turn to characterize the no-deviation conditions. First, we determine these
conditions for the equilibrium described in Part (a) of the proposition.
 Part (a): No-deviation condition for liquid banks: Consider the liquid bank i. If it
deviates by choosing to be illiquid, its expected prot is computed as follows:
dei = Max
ci2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ci)i (yL   p)
)
subject to
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
There are two possibilities: i = 1 or i < 1. If i < 1, the above program becomes
dei = Max
ci2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ci)i (yL   p)
)
subject to
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
1  Ei   ci
1  ci < p
p = f +

4
  (i   f) (1  ci)
By computing the FOC, we nd that the objective function is increasing with ci,
which implies that dei , determined as above, is always lower than the bank iex-
pected prot in the equilibrium. If i = 1, the program determining the bank is
expected prot in case of deviation can be rewritten as follows:
dei = Max
ci2[0;1]
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ei   ci (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ci) (yL   p)
)
subject to
ci <
1  Ei   f
1  f
1  Ei   (1  ) (ci + (1  ci)p)

  ci > (1  ci) p
and
p = f +

4
2  ci
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It is easily to check that the objective function is decreasing with ci, which implies
that:
dei = yH (1  ) f   1 + Ei + (1  )

8
Hence, bank i will not deviate if and only if
Ei +
Ei   4
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1) + (1  )
1
2

yL   f   
2

 yH (1  ) f   1 + Ei + (1  ) 
8
which yieds
Ei > E3
The proof is similar to bank j, i.e.
Ej  E3
 Part (a): No-deviation condition for illiquid bank: Note that illiquid bank k can
deviate in two ways: the rst option is that it deviates by choosing to be liquid. It
can also deviate by holding more cash so that it is still illiquid but can survive the
liquidity shock.
 If bank k deviates by choosing to be liquid: given that two other banks are
liquid, it is easily to see that bank k will hold an amount of cash equal to
1 Ei f
1 f and its expected prot is as follows:
dek = Ek +
Ek
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1) (44)
 If bank k deviates by holding more cash so that it is still illiquid but can survice
the liquidity shock: the cash holdings of bank k are determined by the following
program:
dek = Maxck
(
yH + (1  ) yL   1 + Ek   ck (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
  (1  ) (1  ck)k (yL   p)
)
subject to
ck <
1  Ek   f
1  f (45)
p = yL

2
p  f 
(k   f) (1  ck)
p  f (46)
Constraints (45) - (46) imply:
1  Ek   f
1  f > ck 
1  Ek   f   2
1  f
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Since the objective function is decreasing with ck, we obtain that bank k will
hold
1 Ek f  2
1 f as cash and its expected prot is equal to:
dek = Ek +
Ek +

2
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1) (47)
From (44) and (47), we see that bank k will never deviate if and only if:
yH+(1  ) f 1+Ek+(1  ) 
2
 Ek+
Ek +

2
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
which yields
Ek  E2
Next, we determine the no-deviation conditions for the equilibrium described in Part
(b) of the proposition.
 Part (b): No-deviation condition for liquid banks: Consider the liquid bank i: it can
deviate by choosing to be illiquid. Note that among two other banks, one is illiquid
and the other holds just a minimum required amount of liquidity to be liquid. Hence,
if bank i deviates by choosing to be illiquid, it will be closed. Its expected prot is
thus:
dei = yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ei
Bank i will never deviate if and only if:
Ei+
Ei
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)+(1  )
1
2
(yL   f)  yH+(1  ) f 1+Ei
or equivalently
Ei  E4
Similarly, liquid bank j will not deviate if and only if:
Ej  E4
 Part (b): No-deviation condition for illiquid bank : bank k can only deviate by
chossing to be liquid. Since two other banks are also liquid, the expected prot of
bank k in case of deviation is as follows:
dek = Ek +
Ek
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
Hence, the no-deviation condition for bank k is
yH + (1  ) f   1 + Ek  Ek + Ek
1  f (yH + (1  ) yL   1)
which implies
Ek  E1
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